The Hong Kong of North Korea That Never Was
In June 2011, at a ceremony symbolizing direct involvement from the highest levels of North Korean leadership, China and the DPRK announced the creation of a joint special economic zone covering Hwanggumpyong Island and its neighbor Wihwa (Wihwa-do) to the north. The project was rooted in agreements reached during a visit by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in 2009 and championed by Jang Song-taek, Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law and one of the country's most powerful officials.↗↗
The ambitions were breathtaking. North Korea reportedly proposed a 50-year (extendable to 100-year) lease of the islands to China. The development law, adopted by decree in December 2011, outlined priorities including information technology, light industry, agriculture, commerce, and tourism. Investors would receive extraordinary incentives: tax refunds, duty-free import of equipment, freedom to use foreign currencies, direct labor contracts, unrestricted cell phone and internet access, and the right to transfer profits and assets. Visa-free entry was promised for Chinese nationals and foreigners. A Korean conglomerate and the Hong Kong-based Sunbase International Holdings were among the players in the mix. The phrase "Hong Kong of North Korea" was openly used in reporting about the project's goals.↗↗↗
The strategic logic was clear to both sides. For North Korea, placing the experiment on an island—easily contained, separated from the mainland by water—meant any capitalist "contagion" could be isolated. For China, developing Hwanggumpyong fit into broader plans for northeastern provincial growth, leveraging the Sinuiju-Dandong crossing through which roughly 80 percent of bilateral trade already flowed. Satellite imagery from 2012–2013 shows construction activity on the Chinese side and some land preparation on Hwanggumpyong itself, with new bridges linking the island to the Chinese mainland.↗↗↗
Then everything collapsed. In December 2013, Jang Song-taek was executed after a very public purge, and his indictment specifically cited mishandling of economic cooperation with China. The SEZ agreements he had brokered were effectively called into question. Even before that political earthquake, progress had been slow—infrastructure on the island was virtually nonexistent, with no discernible power supply requiring submarine cables from the Chinese side. North Korea subsequently announced new economic development zones in other locations along the border, including an Amnokgang Economic Development Zone near Sinuiju, apparently without coordinating with Beijing. The grand Hwanggumpyong experiment became a footnote.↗↗
